Technological Advance and the Growth in Health Care Spending by Richard M. H. Suen
Technological Advance and the Growth in Health
Care Spending￿
Richard M. H. Sueny
University of California, Riverside
September 2006
Abstract
The second half of the twentieth century recorded a rapid growth in health care spending
and a signi￿cant increase in life expectancy. This paper hypothesizes that technological
progress in medical treatment, combined with rising incomes, are the driving forces behind
these two trends. Using a stochastic, multi-period overlapping-generations model as the
analytical vehicle, this paper argues that the rapid growth in medical spending is not driven
by factors associated with market structures or insurance opportunities, but instead by
factors underlying the production and accumulation of health. According to this model,
improvements in medical treatment and rising incomes can explain all of the increase in
medical spending and more than 60% of the increase in life expectancy at age 25 during the
second half of the twentieth century.
Keywords: Technological progress, life expectancy, medical spending, health
JEL classi￿cation: E13, I12, O11, O33
￿This paper bene￿ted enormously from the advice of Jeremy Greenwood. The author also thanks `rpÆd
`brahÆm, Mark Bils, Eva Carceles-Poveda, Glenn Harrison, Juergen Jung, Shinichi Nishiyama and other seminar
participants at the Carleton University, Georgia State University, University of Miami, University of Rochester,
Simon Fraser University, SUNY at Albany, UC Riverside, University of Southern California, and conference
participants at the 2006 Midwest Macro Meetings, 2009 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric
Society for helpful comments.
yDepartment of Economics, Sproul Hall, University of California, Riverside CA 92521-0427. Email:
richard.suen@ucr.edu
11 Introduction
It is well documented that over the latter half of the twentieth century, Americans faced a
rapid growth in health care spending and a signi￿cant increase in longevity. Over the period
1950-2001, real per-capita personal medical spending increased by a factor of 9.7, while life
expectancy at age 25 extended by 6.8 years. Despite the wide disparity in health care systems,
similar patterns were observed in other OECD countries over the same time period. This
suggests that at least part of these changes was driven by factors that are common across
borders. The same time period also witnessed an in￿ ux of new techniques and technologies
that revolutionized the practice of medicine. Procedures that once existed only in fantasy,
like open-heart surgery, organ transplants, in vitro fertilization, etc., are now in widespread
practice. This paper hypothesizes that the combination of technological progress in medical
treatment and rising incomes is the driving forces behind the increase in both medical spending
and longevity.
To address the question in hand, a stochastic, multi-period overlapping generations model
is adopted as the analytical vehicle. The core of the analysis is the individual￿ s demand for
health. Health is formulated as a stock that prolongs life, while medical spending is considered
as an investment into this stock. At each age, a person faces two types of uncertainty. First,
there is a given probability of getting sick. Diseases are considered to be negative shocks that
lower a person￿ s health status. The severeness of illness can be alleviated by transforming
medical care into new units of health. Second, at the end of each age, the person will face a
certain probability of dying. This probability is endogenously determined by the health status.
Health is demanded because it raises the survival probability in all states and all future periods.
Using medical care as input, health is produced via a health production function. Medical care
refers to commodities such as a hospital stay or a physician visit. The current state of the art
of medical technology is embodied in the medical treatment received during the hospital stay
or physician visit. Medical treatment refers to a set of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
targeted on certain diseases or conditions. In the model, this is captured by the form of the
production function. Medical technology is improved when innovations in medical treatment
raise the marginal product of medical care in producing health. In the current framework, such
an innovation is expenditure raising for two reasons. First, more e⁄ective treatment encourages
use at all ages. This is particularly prominent among the elderly with poor health. When
productivity is low, receiving medical treatment does not bring much improvement in their
chances of survival and so medical spending tends to be low (or even zero). The advent of new,
e⁄ective technologies brings new hopes and medical spending increases signi￿cantly as a result.
Second, when lives are extended by the new technologies, additional spending will be incurred
during the added years of life. In other words, total medical expenditures increase because
people live longer.
The same topic is studied in the recent work by Hall and Jones (2007). There are two
2major di⁄erences between this and the current work. First, Hall and Jones believe that income
growth by itself can explain the expansion in medical spending. The key assumption behind
their argument is that consumption in medical services is more income elastic than other form
of consumption. The current paper emphasizes both technological improvement and income
growth. In the quantitative analysis , it is shown that income growth alone is not enough to
generate the observed increase in medical spending. Another major di⁄erence is that in Hall
and Jones (2007), there is no uncertainty in medical spending and hence no role for health
insurance. In the current study, the relationship between medical spending and insurance
coverage is examined.
Health insurance is central for the question in hand. Earlier studies contended that the
growth in health care spending is mainly due to the fact that the U.S. population is overinsured.1
The argument is as follows. Traditional insurance that reimburses part of the medical expenses
e⁄ectively lowers the marginal cost of medical care. The purchase of health insurance thus
induces people to spend more than they would choose to if they were uninsured. The situation
is exacerbated by the fact that employer-provided health insurance is tax-deductible which
results in ￿excessive￿ purchase of health insurance and hence ￿excessive￿ medical spending.
This argument is re-examined in this paper. This is done by comparing two model economies
with di⁄erent degrees of insurance opportunity. In the benchmark model, two sources of health
insurance are available via which consumers can protect themselves against unexpected need
for medical expenses. First, there is a private insurance market in which reimbursement health
insurance contracts are traded. Second, a public health insurance program, similar to the
Medicare program, is provided by the government. In the comparison, this benchmark model is
used to represent the real world. In the second model, both public and private health insurance
are removed. The two models are identical in all other aspects. The di⁄erences between the
two thus capture the impact of expanded insurance coverage on medical spending.
In the quantitative analysis described in section 4, two steady states are constructed, based
on the benchmark model, to represent the U.S. economy in 1950 and 2001. The calibrated
model is able to match the observed changes in medical spending and insurance coverage.
It also yields reasonable predictions on the life-cycle behavior of consumption and medical
spending. When the same set of parameters is imposed on the economy with no insurance,
the following predictions can be obtained. First, a large increase in medical spending occurs
over time even when consumers are cut o⁄ from all insurance markets. Second, technological
progress in medical treatment, coupled with rising incomes, can explain all the increase in
medical spending, and more than 60% of the increase in life expectancy at age 25 during the
second half of the twentieth century. These ￿ndings illustrate the main idea of this paper: The
increase in medical spending is not driven by factors associated with insurance opportunities
or market structures, but by factors underlying the production and accumulation of health.
1See, for instance, Pauly (1986) for a review of this literature.
3The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the trends
in medical spending, life expectancy and insurance coverage during the second half of the
twentieth century. It also brie￿ y describes several major changes that the U.S. health care
sector has gone through over the past hundred years. Section 3 presents the model economies.
Section 4 discusses the calibration procedure. The main ￿ndings are reported in section 5. This
is followed by some concluding remarks in the sixth section.
2 History
2.1 Some Facts
Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic increase in real per-capita personal medical expenditures during
the twentieth century.2 In 1950 a typical American spent $448 (in constant 2001 dollars) on
medical care. This increased by a factor of 9.7 over the next ￿fty years and reached $4,361 in
2001.3 During the same period, real per-capita GDP increased only by a factor of 2.9. The
result is a rising share of medical spending in GDP as shown in Figure 2. Over the period
1950-2001 the share of medical spending in GDP increased from 3.7% to 12.2%. From the
￿gure it is obvious that the rising trend began at some point around 1950. This is one of the
reasons why this paper focuses on the latter half of the twentieth century.4 When Medicare and
Medicaid were enacted in 1966 the share of medical spending had already increased to 4.9%.
Another way to assess the rising importance of health care spending is to consider its share in
personal consumption expenditures.5 In 1950 medical spending accounted for a mere 5.6% of
total personal consumption expenditures, much smaller than the shares on food (27.5%) and
housing (11.1%). As depicted in Figure 3, this share remained almost constant during the early
decades and started gaining momentum only in the 1950s. The share of medical spending had
already reached 7.9% by the year 1966. In 2001 the share of medical care in total consumption
expenditures was 17.3%, exceeding the share on either food (13.5%) or housing (15.0%). Over
2Personal medical expenditures include spending on hospital services; physician, dentist and other profes-
sional services; prescription drugs and medical equipment; nursing home services, etc. These exclude expenses
on the following items: net costs of health insurance, medical facilities construction, program administration,
government public health activities and research. For 1930-1960, the data source is Worthington (1975). For
1960-2001, the data are obtained from the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, ￿Health Accounts￿ ,
<http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/default.asp>. These data are then divided by the total civilian population
and de￿ ated by the GDP de￿ ator.
3In the quantitative analysis, only those aged 25 or above will be considered. Thus it is of interest to consider
the average spending of this group. Since these statistics are not readily obtainable, they are computed using the
data reported in the technical appendix of Meara, White and Cutler (2004). Details of the computation can be
found in Appendix A1. For 1950 and 2001, the average medical spending of those aged 25 years or above were
$584 (in constant 2001 dollars) and $5,140, respectively. This implies an average annual growth rate of 4.36%.
4Another reason is that formal medicine played a signi￿cant role in reducing mortality during the same time
period but not earlier on. Readers are referred to the historical discussions for further details.
5Data on personal consumption expenditures (PCE) are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
National Income and Product Accounts. The medical care component of PCE is replaced by the personal
medical expenditures described in foonote 2. This is because the former includes net costs of health insurance.
4the same time period, medical spending has increased for all age groups but at di⁄erent paces.
The increase was particularly prominent among the elderly (those aged 65 or above). Over the
period 1950-2000, real per-person spending among the elderly grew at an average annual rate
of 5.4%, whereas the corresponding growth rate for the non-elderly was 3.8%.6
The tremendous increase in medical expenditures was accompanied by (i) a decline in mor-
tality and (ii) an expansion in insurance coverage. The declining trend in age-adjusted mortality
and the corresponding increase in life expectancy are shown in Figure 4.7 In the middle of the
twentieth century, mortality rate stood at 1,446 per 100,000 population. Over the next 50 years,
mortality dropped by 40% and became 855 per 100,000 population. An average American at
age 25 in 1950 could expect to live 46.6 more years. This increased to 53.4 years by 2001.8 An
alternative way to describe the increase in longevity is to consider the proportion of population
that survives to a certain age. Figure 5 compares the probability of being alive in various
ages (conditional on being alive at age 25) between 1949-51 and 2001.9 A signi￿cant outward
expansion in survival probabilities was recorded over the passage of time.
Insurance coverage also expanded markedly during the post-war era. Between 1950 and
2001 the proportion of total civilian population covered by health insurance increased from
58% to 85.7%.10 At the same time, private insurance became an increasingly important source
of payment for personal health care [see Figure 6].11 In 1950 68.3% of total personal health
care expenses were paid directly by the consumers, whereas only 8.5% were paid by private
insurance. Half a century later, out-of-pocket expenditures accounted for only 17% of the total
spending, while 35% were paid by private insurance. Since the introduction of Medicare and
Medicaid, the U.S. government has assumed a considerably larger role in ￿nancing the provision
of health care. In 2001 43.4% of total medical spending were paid by the government.
6See Appendix A1 for details.
7Mortality rates are age-adjusted when the underlying age composition is held constant as in certain
base year. This makes comparisons across years meaningful. For the data reported here, the base year
is 2000. Unless otherwise speci￿ed, all mortality rates reported in this work are age-adjusted and come
from the same source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics,
<http://www.cdc.org/nchs/about/major/dvs/mortdata.htm>.
Data on life expectancy can be found in National Vital Statistics Reports, v.52, no.14.
8Data on life expectancy are constructed using cross-sectional data on age-speci￿c death rates for the desig-
nated years. These data include deaths due to events that are not directly related to health, such as accident,
homicide and suicide. Although these three causes accounted for only 8.3% of all deaths in 1950 and 6.3% in
2001, they accounted for a large fraction of deaths among teenagers and young adults. Readers are referred to
Tables A3 and A4 for detailed statistics. For the purpose of this paper, it is desirable to consider deaths caused
by health-related events only. When deaths due to accident, homicide and suicide are removed, life expectancy
at age 25 was 47.7 years in 1950 and 54.2 years in 2001.
9Deaths due to accident, homicide and suicide are removed when preparing these ￿gures.
10Source: (i) 1950, Anderson and Feldman (1956), Table A1. (ii) 2001, U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance
Coverage, 2001.




One of the most remarkable developments in the twentieth century is the rapid decline in
mortality. In 1900 mortality rate stood at 2,518 per 100,000 population, while life expectancy
at birth was just 47.3 years. This was a time when infectious diseases were rampant. Pneumonia,
in￿ uenza and tuberculosis topped the list of leading killers at that time. These, together with
diphtheria, measles, scarlet fever and whooping cough, accounted for 27% of all deaths. The
in￿ uenza epidemic of 1918, which pushed the death rate to 2,542 per 100,000 population,
demonstrated how devastating these diseases could be if left unchecked. The prevalence of
infectious diseases also made young children￿ s lives more vulnerable. Infant mortality rate was
lamentably high at the beginning of the last century. One out of every six babies born could
not survive their ￿rst year [see Table 1]. Children under 5 years of age accounted for 30% of
all deaths while persons aged 65 and above accounted for only 24%. Over the ensuing ￿fty
years, mortality rate fell by 42.6% while average lifespan extended by 20.9 years. The decline
in mortality during early childhood was particularly impressive. By 1950 less than 10% of all
deaths were for people under ￿ve years of age. The changing age composition of deaths is
illustrated in Figure 7.
What caused these changes in mortality ? In particular, what was the role played by
modern medical science ? E⁄ective control over infectious diseases was the driving force behind
the reduction in mortality during the ￿rst half of the twentieth century. This was primarily the
result of rising living standards and improved public health measures, such as proper sewage
disposal and puri￿ed water.12 Formal medicine only played an ancillary role in the battle
against infectious diseases at that time.
By the end of the nineteenth century, medical researchers had already identi￿ed the causes of
various infectious diseases. But little was known on how to treat them. When e⁄ective medicine,
such as penicillin and other antibiotics, ￿nally emerged in the 1940s, infectious disease mortality
was already under control [see Table 2]. The quality of medical practice during the earlier
decades is also an issue of concern. Regulations on medical practice and medical education were
nonexistent before 1920. This provided a breeding-ground for a large number of incompetent
practitioners produced by proprietary medical schools. These schools would admit anyone who
could a⁄ord the tuition fees without regard to their academic background. Many specialists
in the profession were self-named and poorly trained.13 Even for well-trained physicians, there
was not much they could do in terms of diagnosis and treatment. A physician recalled the state
of the art in internal medicine in 1930 as follows:
￿We had only a few drugs to prescribe then, and our diagnostic aids were simple
12Interested readers are referred to Dowling (1977) for a detailed and non-technical account on the battle
against infectious diseases.
13Rosen (1983), p.82.
6and crude. By contrast, a half century later, some thousands of drugs are available
for use in the practice of internal medicine, most of which have been proved e⁄ective.
... Similarly with diagnostic procedures, there was little to be done up to 1930...
. We had no chemical tests for blood levels of enzymes, electrolytes, gases, or
hormones, and none of our modern imaging techniques were available.￿ Beeson
(1980).
Major reforms in medical education and practice had been undertaken since. Academic
prerequisites for medical education were speci￿ed. Clinical teaching became part of the medical
curriculum and internship was required for graduation. A system of board certi￿cation was
established to regulate the professional accreditation of specialists. All these have had far-
reaching impact on the quality of physicians and the public￿ s perception towards them.
The ￿rst half of the twentieth century also witnessed a rapid development in private health
insurance. The ￿rst generation of health insurance contracts, which were developed during the
1930s, took the form of prepayment plans organized by hospital associations, medical profes-
sions and community-consumer groups. Su⁄ering from the accumulation of unpaid medical bills
during the Great Depression, hospitals and physicians throughout the country adopted prepay-
ment plans with the primary concern of ensuring payment. Most of the earlier plans o⁄ered
full coverage without deductible for medical services up to a certain limit.14 Because these
contracts were intended to keep bene￿ts low in amount and short in duration, subscribers were
exposed to unexpected major medical expenses. Despite this undesirable feature, the spread
of health insurance was swift. Within the decade of 1941-1950, the percentage of population
enrolled for hospital bene￿ts increased from 12.4% to 50.7%.15
2.2.2 After 1950
During the latter half of the twentieth century, infectious diseases were no longer a major threat
towards public health. As more people survived to old age, the prevalence of chronic diseases
became more alarming. In 1900 diseases of the heart and cancers together accounted for only
15.1% of all deaths.16 Over the period 1900-1950, mortality rates of the two increased by 2.2
and 1.7 times, respectively [see Figure 8]. By the year 1950, 54.1% of all deaths were due to
these diseases and the share remained over 50% since. During the 1950s and early 1960s the
rising trend of life-expectancy was hindered by high death rates resulting from these two groups
of diseases. The upward trend was not resumed until heart disease mortality began to decline
sharply in the late 1960s [see Figures 4 and 8]. Between 1965 and 2001, heart disease mortality
14Encouraged by the success of the prepayment associations, insurance companies also o⁄ered similar bene￿t
patterns. The major di⁄erence is that insurance companies o⁄ered bene￿ts in cash, whereas the prepayment
associations o⁄ered bene￿ts in services. Readers are referred to Faulkner (1960) for further details on the early
health insurance plans.
15Source: Reed (1965).
16￿Diseases of the heart￿include ischemic (or coronary) heart diseases and other form of heart diseases.
7fell by 54.3%. This coincided with the advent of many innovations used in cardiovascular
treatment. Evidence suggests that these innovations had made a signi￿cant contribution to the
decline in mortality. Medical researchers Goldman and Cook (1984) reported that about 40% of
the decline in coronary heart disease mortality over the period 1968-1976 can be attributed to
life-saving innovations. More recently, Hunink, Goldman and Torsteson (1997) found that nearly
half of the decline in coronary heart disease mortality during 1980-1990 was brought about by
better medical treatment. Their results are supported by the work of Cutler, McClellan and
Newhouse (1999), which found that 55% of the reduction in mortality from heart attacks during
the period 1975-1995 can be attributed to improvement in medical treatment, especially the
use of new pharmaceuticals.
As for cancers, despite the rising trend in cancer mortality, the probability of surviving
the disease has been increasing during the post-war decades. The ￿ve-year relative survival
rate for all forms of cancer increased from 35% to 62.7% over the period 1950-1995.17 Again,
the march of science has made a signi￿cant contribution. Lichtenberg (2004) found that new
drugs that emerged after 1970 could account for 50-60% of the increase in age-adjusted survival
rates in the ￿rst six years after diagnosis. All this evidence suggests that technological progress
in medical treatment played an important role in saving lives during the second half of the
twentieth century.
Meanwhile, the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases and the rapid growth in medical
costs raised concerns on the ￿nancial costs of prolonged and catastrophic illnesses. Since 1948
insurance companies began to o⁄er a new type of plan, known as major medical expense policy,
which provided coverage on the especially high costs of major and prolonged illnesses. The
plan could be used either as a supplement for basic coverage, or as a separate comprehensive
program. Conceivably, these policies would expose the insurers to tremendous liabilities. To
ease these burdens, an initial deductible and a coinsurance provision were added so that the
subscribers would bear some part of the costs. Over the period 1960-1986, the percentage of
population protected by major medical expense policies increased from 17.6% to 65.8%.18
Another major development in the health insurance industry was the introduction of Medicare
and Medicaid programs in 1966. The current study focuses on Medicare which targets primarily
the elderly (over 65 years of age) population. One problem of the Medicare program is that it
fails to cover very long hospital stays, which are highly expensive.19 This exposes the bene￿-
ciaries to substantial medical expenditure risk. In response, over 60% of Medicare bene￿ciaries
purchased supplementary private insurance in 2001.
17Lichtenberg (2004) argued that the increase in cancer mortality was largely the result of rising incidence.
18Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., various issues.
19A brief description on the risk-sharing structure of Medicare can be found in Appendix A2.
83 The Economic Environment
The model economy is composed of overlapping generations. In each period, a continuum of
ex ante identical agents is born. The size of cohort is growing at a constant rate ￿ > 0: Each




and zero wealth. In
each period, each agent faces a positive probability of dying. The maximum age that one can
live to is age J: Starting from age 0; an agent works until the exogenously given retirement
age I (< J) is reached. During the working years, an age-j agent is endowed with ej units of
e⁄ective labor which he supplies inelastically to the market. An individual supplies no labor
when retired; i.e., ej = 0 for j = I + 1;:::;J: There is also a set of initial old agents. An agent
who is of age j ￿ 1 at time 0 is said to be of generation ￿j: The health stock of these initial
old agents at time 0 is again given by h:
In this economy there are two commodities: a consumption good and medical care. The
former is produced by a neoclassical production function which will be described later. Each
unit of consumption good can be transformed into 1
p units of medical care. All medical care is
used to produce new units of health via the production function i : R+ ! R+: The function is
assumed to be twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. The
accumulation process of health is given by
h0 = i(m) + (1 ￿ ￿h)h + "; (1)
where h denotes health status at the beginning of the current age, h0 is health status at the end
of the current age; ￿h 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate of health and " is a health shock. In each
period, an agent faces an idiosyncratic health shock, "; drawn from a ￿nite set E = f"1;:::;"Sg:
The severeness of the health shock is ranked according to "1 = 0 > "2 > ::: > "S: This
shock is assumed to be independently distributed over time and across agents. In addition,
the probability distribution of the shock is assumed to be age-dependent.20 Speci￿cally, the
probability of drawing " 2 E at age j is denoted by ￿j ("); with
P
"2E ￿j (") = 1 for all j:
Conditional on being alive at the current age with end-of-period health status h0; the prob-
ability of surviving to the next period is ￿(h0). The function ￿ : R ! [0;1] is made up of two
parts: (i) for h0 > 0, ￿(h0) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and satis￿es
lim
h0!1
￿(h0) = 1; (ii) for h0 ￿ 0; ￿(h0) = 0: The latter means death is certain when health falls be-
low zero. Moreover, it is assumed that the composite function b ￿(m) ￿ ￿[i(m) + (1 ￿ ￿h)h + "]
is strictly concave.
Utility is zero when deceased. The period utility function for a living agent is given by
U (c); where c denotes current consumption. The utility function U : R+ ! R++ satis￿es all
the usual assumptions and strict positivity; i.e., U (c) > 0 for c > 0: The last assumption is
20This assumption is motivated by the fact that chronic diseases are much more likely to occur among the
elderly. In the quantitative analysis, only chronic diseases are considered.
9added to ensure that being alive with positive consumption is always preferable to being dead.
The consumption good is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function,
y = Ak￿l1￿￿; ￿ 2 (0;1); (2)
where y denotes aggregate output, k denotes aggregate physical capital, A represents total
factor productivity, and l is the aggregate labor input. The stock of physical capital accumulates
according to
k0 = a + (1 ￿ ￿k)k; (3)
with the initial level of capital, k0; given. The variable a represents gross investment; and
￿k 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
3.1 The Benchmark Economy in 1950
3.1.1 Market Structure
In the framework described above, agents face two types of uncertainty: uncertainty concerning
their end-of-period health and uncertainty with respect to the length of their lifetime. This
section describes an economy in which agents can insure against the health risk but not the
mortality risk. In this economy, there is a private insurance market in which reimbursement
health insurance contract is being traded. Private annuities are missing, so agents cannot
protect themselves against the uncertainty in consumption brought by an uncertain length of
lifetime. In terms of investment opportunities, physical capital is the only channel for investment
and agents are not allowed to borrow. In the quantitative analysis, this model is used to
represent the U.S. economy in 1950, a time before the Medicare program is implemented.
Hence, public health insurance is not considered in here.
In the private insurance market, insurance companies cannot observe the health status of
their customers. All these companies can observe are their customers￿medical expenses. As a
result, insurance bene￿ts are paid as reimbursement on the actual expenses, which are controlled
by the insured. It is assumed that a standard, perfectly divisible contract is being traded. This
means agents can buy any positive amount, e x ￿ 0; of this contract. The health insurance
contract is characterized by a premium rate ￿p and a piecewise linear reimbursement function
￿ : R+ ! R+: The latter is a function of the actual expenses incurred by the insured, pm; and





0 if pm ￿ d
￿(pm ￿ d) if pm 2 [d;l]
L if pm > l;
where d ￿ 0 is the deductible, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the coinsurance rate and L is the maximum amount
10that the insurance company is willing to pay.21 The reimbursement function is assumed to be
continuous on R+; so L = ￿(l ￿ d):
In the absence of an annuity market, agents who die prematurely (before age J) will leave
behind their wealth as accidental bequests. These are distributed to all of the survivors in a
lump-sum fashion.
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period, an agent chooses the
amount of private health insurance and a set of state-contingent decision rules for consumption,
medical care and savings. All these decisions are made before the current health shock is
realized. After it is realized, commodities speci￿ed by the decision rules are delivered and
reimbursement from the insurance is made. Before the end of the period, the agent is informed
whether or not he will survive in the next period.
3.1.2 Individual￿ s Problem
Consider an age-j agent who enters the period with characteristics ￿ = (h;s￿1); where s￿1 is
previous savings in terms of physical capital. Let w be the market wage rate for e⁄ective unit of
labor, r be the (gross) return from physical capital and b be the per-capita amount of accidental
bequests. The agent chooses the amount of insurance and a set of state-contingent decision rules,






















hj+1 (￿;") = i[mj (￿;")] + (1 ￿ ￿h)h + ";
sj (￿;") ￿ 0;
for " 2 E and e xj (￿) ￿ 0:
Denote by zj =
￿
"0;:::;"j￿
a history of health shock up to age j and let Zj be the set of
all possible zj: The notation z￿1 is used to denote the empty past history of a newborn agent.
The following lemma establishes that the agent￿ s decisions for consumption, medical spending,
saving and insurance can be expressed solely as a function of the history of health shocks.
21Suppose an agent with a medical bill pm purchased e x > 0 units of insurance. The agent would split the
medical bill into e x shares and subject each portion to a separate reimbursement schedule. His out-of-pocket
expenditures are then given by




pm if pm=e x ￿ d
(1 ￿ ￿)pm + e x￿d if pm=e x 2 [d;l]
pm ￿ e xL if pm=e x ￿ l:













Proof. See Appendix B.
3.1.3 Competitive Equilibrium
This section describes a competitive equilibrium for a stationary environment in which the life-
cycle patterns of individual consumption, medical spending and savings are time-invariant. It





denote the measure of all age-j agents with shock history zj: The population































= ￿0 ("); (5)


















in the next period. Each deceased agent will leave behind an amount rsj
￿
zj￿
: The amount of




















All the savings are channelled to the capital market. The capital market clears when aggre-













In the consumption good sector, ￿rms hire labor and rent physical capital from the factor
markets to produce output according to (2). Both goods and factor markets are assumed to be
perfectly competitive, hence
r = ￿Ak￿￿1l1￿￿ + 1 ￿ ￿k; (8)
w = (1 ￿ ￿)Ak￿l￿￿: (9)














+ ￿kk = Ak￿l1￿￿: (10)










The private insurance market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The insurance premium,


























A competitive equilibrium for this economy is de￿ned below:
De￿nition 2 A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of allocations for all types

















jzj￿1 2 Zj￿1;" 2 E
￿J
j=0 ; a set






j=0 ; and per-
capita bequest b such that
1. Given the prices and bequest, ’ solves the agent￿ s problem.
2. Factor inputs and prices, fk;l;r;wg; satisfy (8) and (9).
3. The population measures evolve according to (4) and (5).
4. Per-capita bequest, b, is given by (6).
5. All markets clear; i.e., (7), (10), (11) and (12) hold.
3.2 The Benchmark Economy in 2001
3.2.1 Market Structure
Moving forward across time, the year is now 2001. The only di⁄erence between 1950 and 2001
in terms of insurance opportunity is that public health insurance programs, such as Medicare
and Medicaid, are present in 2001. To capture this, a public health insurance program similar
to Medicare is introduced into the economy described above. In the quantitative exercise, this
version of the benchmark economy is calibrated to mimic the U.S. economy in 2001.
Under the public health insurance program, all retirees are automatically enrolled at zero






0 if pm ￿ dg
￿g (pm ￿ dg) if pm 2 [dg;lg]
Lg if pm > lg:
Notice that for pm > 0; the program covers only part of the medical expenses. This creates an
incentive for the retirees to purchase supplementary insurance from the private health insurance
market to cover the di⁄erences, pm ￿ ￿g (pm); that are not insured by the public health
insurance program. The public insurance program is ￿nanced by a payroll tax ￿ 2 (0;1)
imposed on the working population. For the working agents, private health insurance is the
only source of insurance. Expenditures on private insurance can be deducted from the payroll
tax. The rest of the economy is the same as that described in section 3.1.1.
3.2.2 Individual￿ s Problem
First, consider a retired agent of age j > I who begins the period with characteristics ￿ =
(h;s￿1): His task is to choose ’ = fe xj (￿);cj (￿;");mj (￿;");sj (￿;")j" 2 Eg in order to max-






















vj (￿;") = pmj (￿;") ￿ ￿g [pmj (￿;")];
hj+1 (￿;") = i[mj (￿;")] + (1 ￿ ￿h)h + ";
sj (￿;") ￿ 0;
for " 2 E and e xj (￿) ￿ 0: The variable vj (￿;") represents the amount of medical expenditures
that are not covered by public insurance but potentially covered by supplementary private
insurance.
Next, consider an agent of working age (j ￿ I) with characteristics ￿ = (h;s￿1): His problem

















14hj+1 (￿;") = i[mj (￿;")] + (1 ￿ ￿h)h + ";
sj (￿;") ￿ 0;
for " 2 E and e xj (￿) ￿ 0: As in section 3.1.2, all the decision rules can be expressed in terms of
the shock history.
3.2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
In this economy, the only function of the government is to maintain the public insurance program





























On the left-hand side is the total payroll tax collected less the tax-deductible expenditures on
private health insurance. The right-hand side gives the total reimbursement received by the
bene￿ciaries of the public insurance program.22 The rest of the economy is the same as that
described in section 3.1.3.
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is de￿ned as follow:
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j=0 ; income tax
rate ￿ and per-capita bequest b such that
1. Given the prices and bequest, ’ solves agents￿problem.
2. Factor inputs and prices, fk;l;r;wg; satisfy (8) and (9).
3. The population measures evolve according to (4) and (5).
4. Per-capita bequest, b, is given by (6).
5. The government￿ s budget is balanced in each period, i.e. (13) holds.
6. All markets clear; i.e., (7), (10), (11) and (12) hold.
3.3 The Economy with No Insurance
This section describes an economy in which agents are cut o⁄ from all insurance markets. To
insure themselves against consumption ￿ uctuations brought by the health shock and mortality
22In the quantitative analysis, the tax rate ￿ is taken as exogenously given, while reimbursement function
￿g (￿) is endogenously determined.
15risk, the agents can only adjust their holdings of physical capital. Again, agents are not allowed
to borrow. The agent￿ s problem is to choose a set of state-contingent decision rules, ’ =
fcj (￿;");mj (￿;");sj (￿;")j" 2 Eg; in order to maximize the expected value for the remaining











cj (￿;") + pmj (￿;") + sj (￿;") = wej + rs￿1 + b;
hj+1 (￿;") = i[mj (￿;")] + (1 ￿ ￿h)h + ";
for " 2 E. Since this is just a special case of the benchmark model, a competitive equilibrium
for this economy can be de￿ned in a similar fashion.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The objective of the calibration exercise is to construct two steady states, based on the bench-
mark economies, to represent the U.S. economy in 1950 and 2001. Most of the parameters
in the model can be readily obtained from the data. For those that cannot, a minimization
procedure is used to determine their values. Table 3 summarizes all the parameters used in the
baseline calibration.
Demography In the model economy, one period takes 5 years. Individuals are assumed to
be economically active at age 25. Thus ￿age 0￿in the model refers to the 25-29 age group.
Take I = 7 and J = 15 so that retirement begins at age 65 and the oldest age group is 100-
104. Over the period 1950-2001, the U.S. population grew at an average rate of 1.25% per
year. In the model, the parameter ￿ corresponds to the 5-year population growth rate. Hence,
￿ = (1:0125)
5 ￿ 1 = 0:064:
The survival probability function, ￿(￿); is assumed to take the form of the cumulative
distribution function of a Weibull distribution:
￿(h) = 1 ￿ exp
￿
￿ h￿￿
; for h ￿ 0;
with   > 0 and ￿ > 0: Both   and ￿ are determined by the minimization procedure. The initial
level of health at age 0, h; is assumed to be constant over time and is normalized to 100.
Preferences and Earnings The period utility function takes the standard CRRA form; i.e.,
U (c) = c1￿￿
1￿￿ : Conventionally, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is no less than one. But
then utility might be negative for some positive values of consumption: Thus, the coe¢ cient
must be strictly less than one in order to ensure strict positivity of utility. In the baseline
16calibration, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is set to 0:97: Section 5.3 reports how the
main ￿ndings are a⁄ected when this coe¢ cient varies. The annual subjective discount factor
is taken to be 0:98; so ￿ = (0:98)
5 = 0:904: The age-speci￿c e⁄ective units of labor, fejg
7
j=0 ;
are calibrated using data on money earnings in 1950 and 2001.23 The parameter values are
reported in Table 3b.
Production Technology In the production function for the consumption good, labor￿ s share
of income is ￿xed at 0:67, so ￿ = 0:33: The annual depreciation rate for physical capital is taken
to be 10%: Hence, ￿k = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ 0:1)
5 = 0:410:
Morbidity At each age, there are two possible values of health shock, f"1;"2g. The ￿rst one
corresponds to the state of being ￿healthy￿ , or one without any negative health shock so that
"1 = 0: The second one corresponds to the state of being ￿sick￿ . In the current context, being
￿sick￿means su⁄ering from either coronary heart disease (CHD) or cancers of any form.24 The
probabilities of the two states are computed using the incidence rates of these diseases. Figures 9
and 10 plot the average annual age-speci￿c incidence rates for CHD and cancers, respectively.25
Let qh
j be the annual incidence rate for CHD at age j and qc
j be the corresponding rate for
cancers. In the model, being ￿healthy￿means not su⁄ering from CHD and not su⁄ering from










The probability of being ￿sick￿is ￿j ("2) = 1 ￿ ￿j ("1): The values of these probabilities are
listed in Table 3c. The magnitude of the negative health shock ("2) is determined by the
minimization procedure.
Medical Technology and Prices The production function for health at time t is speci￿ed
as follows:
it (m) = ￿tm￿; (14)
where ￿t > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1): The productivity of medical care at time t is captured by ￿t; while
the cost of medical care is pt: Both are exogenously given in the current model. Intuitively,
medical care includes such commodities as a hospital stay or a physician visit, which are inputs
23For 1950, data on wage and salary incomes obtained from the IPUMS general sample are used. For 2001,
mean earnings by age reported in the Current Population Surveys are used. The labor endowment of those aged
25-29 in 1950 is normalized to unity. The e⁄ective units of labor for all other demographic groups are then
derived by the ratio of mean earnings of that group to the mean earnings of the reference group.
24The importance of these diseases are discussed in section 2.2.2.
25Despite their alarming prevalence during the post-war era, nationwide data concerning the incidence of CHD
and cancers are not available until the 1980s. Source: (i) CHD, The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study
(ARIC), <http://www.cscc.unc.edu/aric>. (ii) Cancers, National Cancer Institute, SEER Cancer Statistics Re-
view, various issues.
17into the production for health. Innovations in medical treatment are likely to raise the price of
these inputs because they are now more productive, and lower the price of output (i.e., health).









Holding other things constant, the price of health would fall if ￿t grows faster than pt:
In the health economics literature, attempts to quantify the pace of technological progress
in medical treatment are sparse. In a recent study, Lichtenberg and Virabhak (2002) estimated
the rate of technological progress embodied in di⁄erent vintages of drugs. The estimated growth
rate ranged from 3.1% to 4.2% depending on the measure of health.26 In the calibration, the
average annual growth rate of ￿t is taken to be 3.4%. Hence, ￿2001 = (1:034)
51 ￿1950: As for
medical in￿ ation, it is measured by the rate of change of the medical care component in the
CPI relative to the general price level. Over the period 1950-2001, this component in￿ ated at
an average annual rate of 2.1% relative to the GDP de￿ ator.27 The cost of medical care in
2001 is determined by p2001 = (1:021)
51 p1950: In the baseline calibration, the price of medical
care in 1950 is normalized to 10. In section 5.3, it is shown that the main ￿ndings are not
sensitive to the choice of p1950: The growth rates of ￿ and p, together with the functional form
in (14), imply that the price of health declined at an average annual rate of 1.26% over the
period 1950-2001.28
Health Insurance In the calibration, all hypothetical insurance contracts are assumed to
be major medical expense contracts. During the 1950s, a typical contract of this sort had an
initial deductible ranging from $50 to $500 (in current dollars) and a coinsurance clause that
required the insured to pay 20% to 25% of the expenses above the deductible.29 In 2001, a
typical contract in the private insurance market had the same range of coinsurance rate and
a deductible that varied between $250 and $2500 (in current dollars). In the calibration, all
private insurance contracts have the same coinsurance rate of 75%; i.e., ￿1950 = ￿2001 = 0:75.
In the 1950 and 2001 steady states, the deductible are taken to be $100 and $250 (in current
dollars), respectively.
As for Medicare in 2001, the cost-sharing structure is simpli￿ed so that it shares the same
26There are two additional reasons why these results are suitable for the current study. First, Lichtenberg
and Virabhak considered drugs that are approved over an extensive time period, from 1939 to 1998. Second,
these estimates are based on a ￿dynamic￿equation in which the pre-treatment (or beginning-of-period) health
is controlled for. This ￿dynamic￿equation is analogous to equation (1) in the current work.
27Admittedly the medical CPI may not be the best measure of medical in￿ ation. A detailed account on the
construction and shortcomings of this subindex can be found in Berndt et al (2001). This is used because there
is no alternative measure for general medical in￿ ation that covers the period in question.
28Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler (1998) estimated the quality-adjusted cost of treating heart attack
over the period 1983-1994. Similar to the current study, they use length of life as the measure of health. According
to their benchmark estimate, the quality-adjusted cost fell at an average annual rate of 1.1%.
29Source: Reed (1965).
18structure as private insurance. Speci￿cally, it involves a deductible of $892 and a coinsurance
rate of 75%; i.e., ￿g = 0:75.
The Remaining Parameters Up to this point, the values of nine parameters are not yet
determined. These include parameters in the survival probability function ( ;￿) and the health
production function (￿1950;￿); the depreciation rate of health capital (￿h); the magnitude of
the negative health shock ("2); and the maximum reimbursement levels for health insurance
(L1950;L2001;Lg): A minimization procedure is used to determine these parameter values. The
idea is to choose these values so that the model could match, as closely as possible, the nine
real-world statistics listed in Table 4. Formally, let ￿ be a (column) vector of parameters,
and S be a (column) vector of selected real-world statistics. Given ￿; the model could yield
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This section is organized into three parts. The ￿rst part documents the main ￿ndings obtained
from the benchmark economies. These ￿ndings are summarized in Table 5. The second part
reports the results obtained when the parameterization described in section 4 is imposed on
the economy with no insurance. The same subsection also answers the question that motivates
the current work, namely ￿How much increase in life expectancy and medical spending can be
attributed to technological progress in medical treatment and rising income ?￿ The last part of
this section illustrates how the baseline results are a⁄ected when some of the parameters vary.
5.1 Findings from Benchmark Economy
Medical Expenditures Under the baseline parameterization, the model is able to capture
the expansion in medical spending between 1950 and 2001. In the model economy, the share
of medical spending in GDP increases from 3.7% to 12.4%. In terms of personal consumption
expenditures (PCE), the share of medical spending increases from 4.8% to 16.6%. Between the
two steady states, real per-capita medical spending increase by a factor of 9.13. The actual
growth factor between 1950 and 2000 is 8.81. In terms of annual growth rate, the predicted
value is 4.43%, while the actual rate is 4.44%. As a reference, real per-capita GDP increases
at an average annual rate of 2.0% in the model economy and the actual rate is 2.1%. In the
1950 steady state, 68.2% of the total medical spending is paid directly by the consumers. In
the 2001 steady state, out-of-pocket expenditures accounted for 24.7% of the total spending,
while Medicare accounted for 15.5%. This shows that there is a large expansion in third-party
payments in the model economy.
19Life Expectancy The model￿ s predictions on life expectancy are depicted in Figures 11 and
12. The underlying survival probabilities are shown in Figures 13 and 14. Under the baseline
parameterization, life expectancy increases by 4.1 years at age 25, 4.0 years at age 45 and 3.1
years at age 65. When compared to the data, the model is able to explain 64.6% of the increase
in life expectancy at age 25, 67.8% at age 45 and 79.5% at age 65. Various measures are
devised to capture the overall changes in life expectancy. The results are reported in Table 6.30
In summary, the model can explain more than 60% of the increase in average life expectancy.
The precise number depends on which measure is used.
Life-cycle Medical Spending This subsection examines the model￿ s predictions on the life-
cycle patterns of medical spending. Figures 15 and 16 show the predicted and observed ratio
of medical spending to income across various age groups.31 According to the data, this ratio is
roughly constant during ages 25 to 64 and increases signi￿cantly afterwards. The current model
is able to replicate these patterns. In the 1950 steady state, the ratio of medical spending to
income before and after age 65 are 0.04 and 0.105, respectively. In the data, the corresponding
￿gures are 0.037 and 0.117. In 2001, the predicted values are 0.123 and 0.635 while the observed
values are 0.096 and 0.612. In the model, the mild increase before age 65 is largely the result
of a low depreciation rate in health. The intuition is as follow. Since the probability of being
sick when young is very low, the main reason why a young agent would invest in his health is
to o⁄set the depreciation. A low depreciation rate in health thus implies a low growth rate in
medical spending when young. The model is able to yield reasonable predictions on the growth
rate of medical spending by age. The predicted growth rate of medical spending among the
elderly and the non-elderly are 5.48% and 4.26%, respectively. The actual growth rates over
the period 1950-2000 are 5.41% and 3.81% [see Table 7 panel B].
One problem with the current model is that it predicts a sharp decline in spending among
those over 75 years of age. The predicted life-cycle pro￿les of medical spending thus exhibit a
hump-shaped pattern which is not observed in the data. This re￿ ects a low demand for health
among the oldest agents in the model. In general, these agents are poor in health and have
a short expected lifespan. The former factor encourages investment in health while the latter
suppresses it. The quantitative results suggest that the suppressing force dominates. In the




￿j;t￿j;t; for t = 1950;2001;
where ￿j;t is the population share of age-j agents at time t and ￿j;t denotes life expectancy at age j. The
second measure is constructed by holding the population structure constant as in 1950. In practice, this involves
replacing ￿j;t with ￿j;1950 in the above expression. The third measure is constructed by holding the population
structure constant as in 2001. The numbers reported in Table 6 are the di⁄erences between the two time periods.
31The actual numbers can be found in Table 7 panel A. These are the ratios of average medical spending for
a particular age group to the average income of that group. For 1950, median incomes reported in Census of
Population: 1950, vol. II, Table 139 are used. For 2000, data on median incomes are obtained from U.S. Census
Bureau, Current Population Survey, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income01/inctab7.html>.
20current framework, health is demanded only because it extends life. Admittedly this ignores
other attributes of health. Daily experience suggests that a person with poor health may not
face any immediate risk of losing life but may su⁄er from some form of disability. Recent studies
on medical spending have shown that disability status is closely related to spending among the
elderly. Focusing on the Medicare bene￿ciaries in 1989-1990, Cutler and Meara (2001) reported
that an average person aged 85 or above spent almost $2,000 more on medical care than one
aged 65-69. Most importantly, a large part of these di⁄erences can be explained by di⁄erences
in disability status. Ignoring other attributes of health may be the reason why the model tends
to underestimate the average spending for the elderly.
Life-cycle Consumption It is well documented that life-cycle consumption pro￿les are
hump-shaped in nature. In a recent study, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) esti-
mated the life-cycle consumption pro￿les using data from the Consumer Expenditures Survey
over the period 1980-1998. They found that after adjusting for life-cycle changes in family size,
non-durable consumption peaked at age 52 and was about 29% higher than that at age 25. The
current model is able to yield similar hump-shaped patterns but the peaks are lower than that
reported by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger. In the 1950 steady state, consumption reaches
its peak at ages 45-49.32 The peak level is about 19% higher than that in ages 25-29. In the
2001 steady state, consumption peaks at ages 50-54. The ratio of peak consumption to that in
ages 25-29 is around 1.18.
5.2 Findings from the Economy with No Insurance
Table 8 compares the results obtained from the two economies under the same parameterization.
Two observations can be made from these ￿ndings. First, in both 1950 and 2001 the economy
with no insurance could yield similar (but slightly lower) levels of life expectancy with fewer
medical spending. When all insurance opportunities are removed, the share of medical spend-
ing in GDP would be lowered by 1.6 percentage points in 1950 and 1.4 percentage points in
2001. In terms of real per-capita spending, these represent a 43% reduction in 1950 and a 11%
reduction in 2001. These ￿ndings are consistent with the idea that people tend to spend more
on medical services in the presence of reimbursement insurance. Second, and most importantly,
a large increase in medical spending between 1950 and 2001 is observed even when all insurance
opportunities are removed. In this case, the share of medical spending increases by 8.9 percent-
age points, while the actual increase is 8.5 percentage points. Thus, the model suggests that
the increase in medical spending during the latter half of the twentieth century is not driven
by factors associated with insurance opportunities.33 Instead, the increase is driven by factors
32Consumption expenditures are the sum of spending on consumption good, out-of-pocket expenditures on
medical care and spending on private health insurance.
33In Hall and Jones (2004), this proposition is taken as given. In the current work, this is formally derived
from a dynamic general equilibrium model.
21that are common in both economies, namely technological progress in medical treatment and
rising incomes. With these two factors alone, the model can explain 63% of the increase in life
expectancy at age 25.
When both the price and productivity of medical care are kept constant; i.e., p1950 = p2001
and ￿1950 = ￿2001; the share of medical spending is merely 2.3% in 2001. The resulting levels of
life expectancy are almost identical to those in 1950.34 Thus the current model suggests that
income growth alone is not enough to explain the observed changes in medical spending and
life expectancy.
5.3 Robustness
In the ￿rst robustness check, di⁄erent values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (￿) are
considered.35 In general, a higher degree of risk aversion is associated with a larger demand for
insurance and a higher level of medical spending (see Table 9a). The demand for insurance is

















The ￿ndings are consistent with the idea that more risk averse agents would like to purchase
more insurance. This in turns leads to a higher level of medical spending. An alternative way
to assess the change in medical spending in each case is to re-calibrate the productivity of
medical care in 1950 (￿1950) so as to match the observed share of medical spending in 1950.
The results are shown in Table 9b. This exercise illustrates that by adjusting one or more of
the undetermined parameters, similar increase in medical spending can be obtained for each
value of ￿.
In the second robustness check, the price of medical care in 1950 (p1950) is varied. Table 10
shows that the results on medical spending are not sensitive to the choice of p1950: For instance,
the share of medical spending reduces from 3.7% to 3.4% when p1950 increases from 10 to 20.
6 Concluding Remarks
Two trends are observed during the latter half of the twentieth century. First, there is a persis-
tent rising trend in medical spending. Second, there is a signi￿cant increase in life expectancy.
The hypothesis examined in this paper is that the combination of technological improvements
in medical treatment and rising incomes is the driving force behind these two trends. The back-
bone of the current analysis is a stochastic, multi-period overlapping-generations model with
34Similar results can be obtained when the experiment is performed in an economy with private insurance only.
In this case, the share of medical spending in 2001 is 3.9%, comparing to the benchmark result of 12.4%.
35In the 2001 economy, the maximum reimbursement of Medicare (Lg) varies in each case in order to keep the
tax rate constant. All other parameters are held constant.
22endogenous survival probability. Agents are ex post heterogeneous in terms of the realizations
of health shocks. Two market structures with di⁄erent degrees of insurance opportunity are
imposed on this environment. In the ￿rst economy, public and/or private health insurance are
available via which the consumers can insure against the health shock. In the second economy,
agents can only self-insure.
Two things are learned from the quantitative analysis. First, in the presence of technological
progress in medical treatment and rising incomes, large increases in medical spending can be
obtained in both the benchmark economy and the economy with no insurance. Hence, unlike
the previous literature, the current model suggests that the rapid growth in medical spending
is not due to factors associated with market structures or insurance opportunities. Second,
in the current framework technological progress in medical treatment and rising incomes can
explain all the increase in medical spending and more than 60% of the increase in average
life expectancy during the second half of the twentieth century. This suggests that the rapid
growth in medical spending re￿ ects optimal responses to changes underlying the production
and accumulation of health.
In mainstream macroeconomic studies, an agent￿ s planning horizon is both ￿xed and pre-
determined. The current work is an initial attempt to explore the macroeconomic implications
of an endogenous and stochastic planning horizon. Growth in medical spending is just one of
the many phenomena associated with a longer lifespan. Intuitively, increases in longevity would
have an impact on other life-cycle decisions such as savings, educational choices and retirement.
The framework presented in this paper can be extended easily to study these issues.
23Appendix A
A1. Medical Spending by Age, 1950-2000
Meara, White and Cutler (2004) estimated the per-person medical spending across age groups
for the years 1963, 1970, 1977, 1987, 1996 and 2000. The results, tabulated in their technical
appendix, are duplicated in Table A1. This section describes how the estimates for the year
1950 are obtained in this paper. First, it is assumed that over the period 1950-1963, per-person
spending in any speci￿c age group had been growing at the same age-speci￿c rate as in 1963-


















The results, labelled as Estimate 1, are reported in Table A1. There are at least two problems
with this approach. First, average spending for the elderly (over 65 years of age) is likely to
be growing at a higher rate in 1963-1977 than in 1950-1963, due to the implementation of
Medicare in 1966. Second, the estimated spending are not increasing in age. In particular,
there is a signigicant decrease in medical spending at ages 55-64. As a partial remedy for
these problems, an additional assumption is imposed to obtain a second set of estimates. The
additional assumption is that average spending for the elderly had been growing at the same







13 for j < 45
mj;1963
(1+￿45)13 for j ￿ 45:
The resulting estimates are almost constant during ages 45-64 and increases signi￿cantly after-
wards. Since the second set of estimates exhibits a more reasonable life-cycle pattern, it is used
in this paper.
The age-speci￿c medical spending is then weighted using census estimates on the size of the
corresponding age group. The results for various subgroups in 1950 and 2000 are reported in
Table A2. Under the second approach, the estimated level of real per-capita spending for the
entire population ($432) is closer to that obtained from the aggregate statistics ($448). Also,
based on Estimate 2, the growth rate of medical spending among the elderly and the non-elderly
are 5.31% and 3.73% respectively.
24A2. The Medicare Program
The program is made up of two main parts.36 Part A, known as the Hospital Insurance program,
paid for hospital services. It is universal and mandatory, meaning every person of age 65 or
above is automatically enrolled into the program. No premium is required. Its major source
of funding has been a payroll tax of 2.9%, which is split between employers and employees.
Part B of the program, referred to as the Supplemental Medical Insurance program, provides
bene￿ts for physician, out-patient, emergency room and other medical services. Enrollment is
voluntary and a monthly premium is required. The intentionally low premium had encouraged
over 90% of the enrollees to participate but contributed only a small portion of the revenues.
Over the years, the government has subsidized approximately 75% of the total revenues of Part
B. The cost sharing structure of the Medicare program is illustrated in Table A5. For the
Supplemental Medical Insurance program, all enrollees are subjected to an annual deductible
and a coinsurance rate of 20%. As for the Hospital Insurance program, Medicare covers all
inpatient hospital expenses for the ￿rst 60 days after an annual deductible. For days 61-90,
the enrollees only have to pay 25% of the expenses. After day 90, each enrollee can draw on
an additional 60-day non-renewable lifetime reserve. During these 60 days, the program covers
50% of the hospital expenses.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
All agents born at time t ￿ 0 begin their lives with an empty past history of shocks, zero wealth







; where z0 = "0: The same is true for the other decision rules.
Suppose the lemma is true for age j = 0;1;:::;n; with n < J: This means savings and
post-treatment health at age n are given by sn (zn) and












The same argument can be applied on the initial old agents: This follows from the fact that
they have empty past history of shocks, zero wealth and initial health status h at time 0: This
completes the proof.
36In 1997, a third part of Medicare, known as Medicare Advantage Program, was implemented. The objective
of this program is to expand the bene￿ciaries￿choices for the supplier of health care.
25Table 1
Age-speci￿c Death Rates [per 100,000 population for speci￿ed group].
1900 1930 1950 1970 2001
Under 1 year 16245 6900 3299 2142 683
1-4 years 1984 564 139 84 33
5-14 years 386 172 60 41 17
15-34 years 699 395 154 140 93
35-54 years 1216 913 580 523 308
55-64 years 2724 2403 1912 1659 964
over 65 years 8226 7372 6232 5892 5087
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for
Health Statistics, <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/dvs/mortdata.htm>.
Table 2
Death Rates* [per 100,000 population] for Selected Infectious Diseases: 1900-1980.
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Pneumonia and In￿ uenza 202.2 155.9 207.8 102.5 70.3 31.3 37.3 30.9 24.1
Tuberculosis 194.4 153.8 113.1 71.1 45.9 22.5 6.1 2.6 0.9
Typhoid Fever 31.3 22.5 7.6 4.8 1.1 0.1 ** ** **
Diphtheria 40.3 21.1 15.3 4.9 1.1 0.3 ** ** **
Whooping Cough 12.2 11.6 12.5 4.8 2.2 0.7 0.1 ** **
Measles 13.3 12.4 8.8 3.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 ** **
* The reported data are not age-adjusted. This is because age-adjusted mortality rates for some diseases
are not available for early years.




Maximum age J 15
Retirement age I 7
Parameters in survival probability function   0:00112￿
￿ 1:892￿
Health endowment h 100
Population growth rate (5-year) ￿ 6:4%
Preferences
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ 0:97
Subjective discount factor (5-year) ￿ 0:904
Production of Goods
Capital￿ s share of income ￿ 0:33
Depreciation rate of physical capital (5-year) ￿k 0:41
Production of Health
Relative price of medical care, 1950 p1950 10:0
Relative price of medical care, 2001 p2001 28:8
Productivity of medical care, 1950 ￿1950 0:274￿
Productivity of medical care, 2001 ￿2001 1:510
Parameter in health production function ￿ 0:10￿
Depreciation of health ￿h 0:065￿
Morbidity
Health shock in ￿healthy￿state "1 0
Health shock in ￿sick￿state "2 ￿20￿
￿The values are obtained from the minimization process.
27Table 3b
Labor Endowment
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Year 1950 1.00 1.16 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.20 1.11
Year 2001 2.43 2.98 3.25 3.42 3.54 3.47 3.66 3.37
Table 3c
Probability of Health States


















1. Share of Medical Spending in GDP, 1950 3.7%
2. Ratio of Medical Spending to Income Among the Non-Elderly, 1950 0.037
3. Ratio of Medical Spending to Income Among the Elderly, 1950 0.117
4. % of Out-of-Pocket Expenditures in Total Medical Spending, 1950 68.3%
5. % of Out-of-Pocket Expenditures in Total Medical Spending, 2001 16.6%
6. Tax rate used to ￿nance Medicare in 2001 2.9%
7. Life Expectancy at age 25 in 1950 47.7
8. Life Expectancy at age 45 in 1950 29.1
9. Life Expectancy at age 65 in 1950 14.3
29Table 5
Main Findings from the Benchmark Model.
Data Model
1950 2001 1950 2001
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 3.7% 12.2% 3.7% 12.4%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 5.6% 17.3% 4.8% 16.6%
Real Per-capita Medical Spending
Annual Growth Rate 4.44%* 4.43%
Medical Spending by Source of Payment
Out of Pocket 68.3% 16.6% 68.2% 24.7%
Medicare 0% 19.4% 0% 15.5%
Life Expectancy by Age
Age 25 47.7 54.2 47.7 51.8
Age 45 29.1 35.0 28.9 32.9
Age 65 14.3 18.2 14.7 17.8
* The reported value is the growth rate of real per-capita spending among those aged 25 or above
during the period 1950-2000. See Footnote 3 for details.
30Table 6
Changes in Life Expectancy between 1950 and 2001.a
Data Model % Explained by the Model
Age 25 6.5 4.1 63.1%
Age 45 5.9 4.0 67.8%
Age 65 3.9 3.1 79.5%
Average Life Expectancyb
Measure 1 3.4 2.7 79.4%
Measure 2 5.6 3.7 66.1%
Measure 3 5.4 3.6 66.7%
aThe reported values are in number of years.
bSee Footnote 30 for the de￿nitions.
Table 7
A. Ratio of Medical Spending to Income by Age*.
1950 2001
Data Model Data￿￿ Model
25-34 0.035 0.033 0.077 0.111
35-44 0.033 0.041 0.074 0.124
45-54 0.040 0.046 0.098 0.134
55-64 0.046 0.043 0.161 0.204
Under 65 0.037 0.040 0.096 0.123
Over 65 0.117 0.105 0.612 0.635





Over 65 5.41% 5.48%
Over 25 4.44% 4.43%
* See Footnote 29 for details.
￿￿The reported values are for the year 2000.
31Table 8
Benchmark Economy vs Economy with No Insurance.
1950 2001
No Insurance Benchmark No Insurance Benchmark
Medical Spending
% in GDP 2.1% 3.7% 11.0% 12.4%
% in PCE 2.7% 4.8% 14.9% 16.6%
Life Expectancy
Age 25 47.5 47.7 51.6 51.8
Age 45 28.8 28.9 32.8 32.9
Age 65 14.6 14.7 17.6 17.8
Table 9a
E⁄ects of Changing the Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion.
Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98
Benchmark Economy, 1950
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 2.1% 2.5% 3.7% 5.5%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 2.7% 3.3% 4.8% 7.1%
Units of Insurance Purchased 0.016 0.020 0.028 0.042
Benchmark Economy, 2001
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 8.6% 10.1% 12.4% 16.9%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 11.6% 13.6% 16.6% 22.5%
Units of Insurance Purchased 0.209 0.254 0.320 0.458
Note: The numbers in bold are the baseline results.
32Table 9b
E⁄ects of Changing the Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion.
Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98
Benchmark Economy, 1950
Productivity of Medical Care, ￿1950 0.470 0.380 0.274 0.200
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 4.8% 4.9% 4.8% 4.9%
Benchmark Economy, 2001
Productivity of Medical Care, ￿2001 2.59 2.09 1.51 1.10
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 11.8% 12.3% 12.4% 13.6%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 15.8% 16.4% 16.6% 18.0%
Note: The numbers in bold are the baseline results.
￿The productivity of medical care in 2001 is given by ￿2001 = (1:034)
51 ￿1950:
Table 10
E⁄ects of Changing the Price of Medical Care in 1950 (p1950)
Price of Medical Care in 1950 5 10 15 20
Benchmark Economy, 1950
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 3.9% 3.7% 3.5% 3.4%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 5.2% 4.8% 4.6% 4.4%
Benchmark Economy, 2001￿
Share of Medical Spending in GDP 13.0% 12.4% 12.1% 11.9%
Share of Medical Spending in PCE 17.3% 16.6% 16.2% 15.9%
Note: The numbers in bold are the baseline results.
￿The price of medical care in 2001 is given by p2001 = (1:021)
51 p1950:
33Table A1
Real Per-Person Medical Spending by Agea
1950 1963 1970 1977 1987 1996 2000
Estimate 1 Estimate 2
0 to 4 years 104 104 241 550 594 1176 1636 1500
5 to 14 years 133 133 240 336 455 690 1005 1446
15 to 24 years 397 397 574 1046 856 1193 2361 1651
25 to 34 years 502 502 744 932 1139 1382 1746 2351
35 to 44 years 507 507 763 768 1184 1441 2253 2847
45 to 54 years 589 589 942 1087 1562 2309 3042 4045
55 to 64 years 419 590 944 1740 2264 3195 5072 5736
65 to 74 years 434 715 1143 2229 3245 5957 7105 8950
75+ years 563 1184 1895 4309 6996 11325 16253 15503
aThe reported values are in constant 2001 dollars.
Table A2
Real Per-Person Medical Spending for Selected Age Groups
1950 2000 Average Annual
Estimate 1 Estimate 2 Growth Rate**
25-64 years 509 539 3,492 3.81%
over 65 years 475 863 12,053 5.41%
over 25 years 504 584 5,140 4.44%
All Ages 385 432 3,868 4.48%
(448) (448) (4,361) (4.66%)
Elderly￿ s Share of
Medical Spending￿ 13.1% 20.6% 45.1%
Population￿ 13.9% 13.9% 19.3%
Note: The reported values are in constant 2001 dollars. The values in parentheses are per-person values obtained
by dividing total personal medical expenditures by the total civilian population.
* These are the elderly￿ s share among those aged 25 and above.
** Average annual growth rate over the period 1950-2001 based on Estimate 2.
34Table A3
Age-speci￿c Death Rates [per 100,000 population for each group], 1950
All Causes Accident Suicide Homicide Subtotala Percentage Shareb
All Ages 936.8 60.6 11.4 5.3 77.3 8.3%
Under 1 3299.2 114.2 0.0 4.4 118.6 3.6%
1 to 4 139.4 36.8 0.0 0.6 37.4 26.8%
5 to 14 60.1 22.7 0.2 0.5 23.4 38.9%
15 to 24 128.1 54.8 4.5 6.3 65.6 51.2%
25 to 34 178.7 45.7 9.1 9.9 64.7 36.2%
35 to 44 358.7 45.7 14.3 8.8 68.8 19.2%
45 to 54 853.9 53.0 20.9 6.1 80.0 9.4%
55 to 64 1901.0 70.8 26.8 4.0 101.6 5.3%
65 to 74 4104.3 116.9 29.6 3.2 149.7 3.6%
75 to 84 9331.1 315.7 31.1 2.6 349.4 3.7%
85 above 20196.9 972.6 28.8 0.0 1001.4 5.0%
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics,
<http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/mx1950_59.pdf>.
a This is the sum of all deaths due to accident, suicide and homicide.
b This is the share of deaths due to accident, suicide and homicide in deaths of all causes.
35Table A4
Age-speci￿c Death Rates [per 100,000 population for each group], 2001
All Causes Accident Suicide Homicide Subtotala Percentage Shareb
All Ages 848.5 35.7 10.8 7.1 53.6 6.3%
Under 1 683.4 24.2 0.0 8.2 32.4 4.7%
1 to 4 33.3 11.2 0.0 2.7 13.9 41.7%
5 to 9 15.3 6.4 0.0 0.7 7.1 46.4%
10 to 14 19.2 7.4 1.3 0.9 9.6 50.0%
15 to 19 66.9 32.8 7.9 9.4 50.1 74.9%
20 to 24 95.0 39.5 12.0 17.3 68.8 72.4%
25 to 29 96.2 31.4 12.6 14.9 58.9 61.2%
30 to 34 113.5 28.5 13.0 11.5 53.0 46.7%
35 to 39 165.9 34.1 14.3 10.4 58.8 35.4%
40 to 44 240.5 36.7 15.2 8.6 60.5 25.2%
45 to 49 354.8 36.0 15.7 7.0 58.7 16.5%
50 to 54 512.4 31.9 14.6 5.5 52.0 10.1%
55 to 59 771.8 29.3 14.0 4.4 47.7 6.2%
60 to 64 1,210.7 31.5 12.0 3.5 47.0 3.9%
65 to 69 1,869.7 36.8 12.7 3.3 52.8 2.8%
70 to 74 2,878.3 49.3 13.9 2.5 65.7 2.3%
75 to 79 4,494.0 80.4 16.4 2.5 99.3 2.2%
80 to 84 7,151.9 130.4 18.9 2.5 151.8 2.1%
85 above 15,112.8 276.4 17.5 2.4 296.3 2.0%
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics,
<http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/mort￿nal2001_work210R.pdf>.
a This is the sum of all deaths due to accident, suicide and homicide.
b This is the share of deaths due to accident, suicide and homicide in deaths of all causes.
36Table A5
The Cost-sharing Structure of Medicare, selected years
Hospital Insurance Supplemental Medical
Insurance
Day 1-60 Day 61-90 Day 91-150 Annual Coinsurance Monthly
(deductible only) (coinsurance) (lifetime reserve) Deductible Rate Premium
1966 $40 75% 50% $50 80% $3.00
1970 $52 75% 50% $50 80% $4.00
1980 $180 75% 50% $60 80% $8.70
1985 $400 75% 50% $75 80% $15.50
1990 $592 75% 50% $75 80% $28.60
1995 $715 75% 50% $100 80% $46.10
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Figure 16: Ratio of Medical Spending to Income by Age, 2001.
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